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CRIMINAL LAW-THE NEED FOR A NEW CONCEPTION 
OF INSANITY AS A DEFENSE TO A CRIME IN NEBRASKA 
... at a day not far remote the teachings of biochemists and 
behaviorists, of psychologists and penologists will transform our 
whole system of punishment.t 
In 1843 a man named M'Naghten, convinced he was being 
persecuted, attempted to assassinate the Prime Minister of Eng-
land and killed the Prime Minister's secretary in the attempt. 
M'Naghten was acquitted by reason of insanity, but public up-
roar caused the House of Lords to make inquiry of the judges con-
cerning the law of insanity. The most important answer to that 
inquiry was that a sane man understands the nature and quality 
of his acts or knows that they are wrong.2 
In 1955, over one hundred years later, a man named Thomp-
son fired five shots at his wife in Omaha, Nebraska; and in re-
viewing his case, the Nebraska Supreme Court set down in its 
opinion the M'Naghten formula as the only test of criminal res-
ponsibility recognized in t}:iis state.3 Though the application of 
the M'Naghten test was not questioned by the plaintiff in error 
in the Thompson case, the language of the court leaves little doubt 
as to its adherence to the formula.4 It is the purpose of this arti-
1 Cardozo, Law and Literature 86 (1931). 
2 M'Naghten's Case, 10 CL. & F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843). 
3 Thompson v. State, 159 Neb. 685, 68 N.W.2d 267 (1955); accord, 
Linder v. State, t56 Neb. 504, 56 N.W.2d 734 (1953); Sedlacek v. Hann, 
156 Neb. 340, 56 N.W.2d 138 (1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 974 (1953); 
MacAvoy v. State, 144 Neb. 827, 15 N.W.2d 45 (1944), cert. denied, 
323 U.S. 804 (1945); Kraus v. State, 108 Neb. 331, 187 N.W. 895 (1922). 
An early Nebraska case tends to recognize the "irresistible impulse" test 
though qualifying it within the M'Naghten rule. See Wright v. People, 4 
Neb. 407 (1876). Contra: Fisher v. State, 154 Neb. 166, 47 N.W.2d 
349 (1951). 
4 One hundred and twelve years later the M'Naghten formula is the 
sole test of criminal responsibility in 29 states; and in 17 others and in 
military law it is still the main test supplemented by the irresistible im-
pulse test. Weihofen, Insanity as a Defense in Criminal Law 66 (1933); 
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cle to scrutinize the tests of insanity being used by other state 
courts and to determine the advisability of the continued use of 
the M'Naghten test in Nebraska. 
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS OF THE TESTS OF INSANITY 
In 1843 when the M'Naghten rule was established, society had 
not yet completely repudiated the ancient concept that the men-
tally ill were possessed of demons and self-made victims of evil 
passions. As late as March of 1862 the Lord Chancellor of Eng-
land stated, "The introduction of medical opinions and medical 
theories into this subject has proceeded upon the vicious principle 
of considering insanity as a disease."5 The reluctance of courts 
to deviate from or repudiate the 1843 test creates glaring in-
justices in capital cases, wherein the accused falls within modern 
concepts of mental illness but is guilty under the M'Naghten form-
ula. "The memorials of our jurisprudence are written all over 
with cases in which those who are now understood to have been 
insane have been executed as criminals."6 
Advances of modern science have left the M'Naghten formula 
eA."iremely vulnerable to attack. The basic objection to the formula 
is that it simply does not fit the modern medical conceptions of 
mind and body.7 It is mired in the ancient concept of a compart-
mentized brain wherein reason, memory, love, and hate dwell se-
curely in their own realms. Today, reason is looked upon as only 
one of the many integrated, overlapping forces constantly re-
acting within the human brain to various stimuli. The M'Naghten 
formula asks society to speculate as to whether, at the moment of 
the act, one of these interwoven forces was engaged in evaluating 
right and wrong. 8 
Tulin, The Problem of l\lental Disorder in Crime: A Survey, 32 Col. L. 
Rev. 933, 940 (1932); authorities coilected in Glueck, l\Iental Disorder 
and the Criminal Law 227 (1925); Keedy, Irresistible Impulse as a De-
fense in Criminal Law, 100 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 956 (1952). 
u As quoted in Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 583, 2 So. 854. 857 (1887). 
6 Bishop. Criminal Law 287 (9th ed. 1923). 
7 Report No. 26, Criminal Responsibility and Psychiatric Expert Testi-
mony, Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry (l\lay 1954 l. 
s In a vigorous dissent to one of the most exhaustive opinions on legal 
tests for insanity in recent years, Chief Judge Biggs declared, "l\I'Naghten's 
case ... assumed the existence of a logic-tight compartment in which the 
delusion holds sway leaving the balance of the mind intact ... (and) the 
criminal retains enough logic in the tight compartment so that from this 
sanctuary of reason he may inform himself as to what the other part of 
his mind, the insane part, has compelled or permitted the body to do. If 
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The glaring need for a complete revision of the concepts of 
legal responsibility is pointed out most vividly in the recent case 
of Durham v. United States.9 In that case the trial court rejected 
the defense of insanity because it was not established that the 
defendant "didn't know the difference between right and wrong," 
or that he was "subject to an irresistible impulse" ;10 and yet, 
between 1945 and 1951, following his discharge from the Navy 
for "a profound personality disorder," the defendant, after com-
mitting various crimes and attempting suicide, had been con-
fined in a mental institution four times. The appeal court realis-
tically asserted its prerogative, repudiated the archaic M'N aghten 
rule,11 and formulated a more scientific and retroactive test for 
criminal responsibility.12 The test "is simply that an accused is 
not criminally responsible if the unlawful act was the product of 
mental disease or defect."13 Yet, simple as the test may be, it 
employs sufficient evidenciary safeguards insofar as it requires 
two elements to perfect a defense of insanity. First, "some evi-
dence of mental disorder" must be introduced to place the burden 
of proving sanity beyond a reasonable doubt upon the prosecu-
tion, and second, there must be a causal connection between the 
mental disease and the act.14 This test has long been effectively 
used by the courts of New Hampshire which have concluded that 
other tests only tend to confuse the jury.15 
While it may be argued that juries of the past, using exten-
sions of the "right and wrong" formula, have reached verdicts 
similar to those now possible under the "Durham rule,"16 this is 
the sane portion ... knows what the insane part compels or permits the 
body to do is wrong, the body must suffer for it ... obliterating both the 
good and bad portions as well as the residence of both." United States 
v. Baldi, 192 F.2d 540, 567 (3d Cir. 1951). This analysis of M'Naghten's 
rule was also stated in Holloway v. United States, 148 F.2d 665, 666 
(D.C. Cir. 1945). 
9 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954). 
10 Id. at 865. 
11 See note 8 supra. 
12 D.C. Code § 24-301 (1951). 
13 Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1954). 
14 Id. at 866, 875. 
lo State v. Jones, 50 N.H. 369, 393 (1871); State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399 
(1870). 
16 Alabama, as early as 1887, because of "discoveries of modern psycho-
logical medicine," modified l\!'Naghten's rule adding a defense where. 
"duress of mental disease" destroys "the power to choose between right 
and wrong," and "the alleged crime was so connected with such mental 
disease, in the relation of cause and effect, as to have been the product 
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hardly a convincing argument against adoption of a new rule 
which would make substantially certain the uniform rendition of 
decisions which are more nearly in keeping with the advancement 
of medical science. The "Durham test" does not exclude "right 
and wrong" or "irresistible impulse" as factors; rather it adds 
to these factors such relevant data as the presence of delusions, 
I. Q., abilities, general comprehension, and menta1 history. 
II. EVIDENCIARY ASPECTS AND EXPERT OPINION UNDER 
THE DURHAM TEST 
Perhaps more important than the factors which are involved 
in the Durham test is the added opportunity for scientific ap-
praisal of all these factors in the light of modern psychiatric 
knowledge. Under present tests the psychiatrist must relate his 
medical data to the defendant's knowledge of right and wrong.17 
His answer to the formalized question of right and wrong may 
establish as legally sane a defendant whom, from his technical 
insight and examination, the psychiatrist may know to be suffer-
ing from a mental condition which contributed to the crime. Un-
der present procedure he is unable to relate or discuss information 
which he feels is important to any determination of the defend-
ant's criminal responsibility. Only in instances where the de-
fendant suffers a disturbed consciousness or idiocy can the psy-
chiatrist make honest replies to questions under the M'Naghten 
formula.18 Under the new test the jury is able to make e:;....-tensive 
inquiry and the psychiatrist is able to testify upon any relevant 
point and relate it to the defendant's mental state.19 
III. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
There are increasing indications that if the gulf between psy-
chiatric knowledge and legal tests for criminal insanity continues 
or offspring of it solely." Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854 (1887). 
"The jury must be satisfied that at the time of committing the act, the 
accused, as a result of disease of the mind ... (a) did not know the na-
ture and quality of the act, or (b) did not know that it was wrong, or 
(c) was incapable of preventing himself from committing it." State v. 
White, 58 N.l\f. 324, 270 P.2d 727 (1954). 
17 In United States v. Baldi, 192 F.2d 540, 568 (3d Cir. 1951), the dis-
senting judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit observed that, "The law, when it required the psychiatrist to state 
whether in his opinion the accused is capable of knowing right from 
wrong, compels the psychiatrist to test guilt or innocence by a concept 
which has almost no recognizable reality." 
18 Report No. 26, op. cit. supra note 7, at 8. 
19 Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d, 862, 872 (1954). 
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to widen it will reach a point where such tests will violate the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal 
Constitution. The Supreme Court has shown its dissatisfaction 
with present tests by speaking in 1948 of "law which reflects the 
most advanced scientific tests and law remaining a leaden footed 
laggard."20 In 1952, the question was again before the Court to 
decide the test's due process implications. It was then stated: 
The science of psychiatry has made tremendous strides since that 
test was laid down in M'Naghten's case, but the progress of science 
has not reached a point where its learning would compel the 
states to eliminate the Right and Wrong Test from their criminal 
law.21 
It appears, therefore, that the Court is growing impatient 
with the disparity between definitions of insanity used by the 
courts and the medical profession. In light of the substantial and 
constant strides that are being made by psychiatry in the diag-
nosis and prognosis of human behavior, it is foreseeable that if 
the various jurisdictions do not alter their present tests of in-
sanity, the Court will prescribe a test which will meet the mini-
mum requirements of the Due Process Clause. 
IV. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CRIMINAL INSANITY PROBLEM 
IN NEBRASKA 
In Nebraska progressive but inadequate statutes have been 
enacted in an attempt to correct the injustices caused by the ap-
plication of the obsolete M'Naghten formula. In many ways these 
provisions are effective in mitigating the harsh exclusion of re-
levant mental data caused by application of M'Naghten's rule, but 
they are at best a devious route. 
A. Prior to Imprisonment 
Nebraska law provides that one who becomes "lunatic or 
insane" after the commission of any crime shall not be put on trial, 
or if after conviction for any crime shall not be sentenced, or if 
a capital sentence has been prescribed, execution shall not be im-
posed until the offender recovers. A commission is set up in 
the latter case to determine the criminal's sanity.22 The test ap-
20 Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463 (1946). 
21 Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952). The majority held an Oregon 
rule requiring the defendant to prove that he was insane at the time he 
committed the crime beyond a reasonable doubt was not a violation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Frankfurter in the dissenting opinion 
points out no change displacing a state's own choice would be justified at 
"this stage of scientific knowledge ... no matter how backward (the pres-
ent test) may be in the light of the best scientific cannons." (italics sup-
plied). 
22 Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-1822, 29-2509 (Reissue 1948). 
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plied to the defendant under these statutes is whether "his state 
of mind and mental condition are such that he does not under-
stand, and is incapable of understanding the nature of the pro-
ceedings against him and of his impending fate and execution, and 
therefore is unable, in a rational manner, to off er a defense or 
make objection to execution."23 Mere imbecility or weakness of 
mind is not enough.24 The term "insanity" as used in the state 
includes "exhibiting unsoundess of mind; mad; deranged in mind; 
delirious; distracted."25 Though the clarity of the definition may 
be disputed, the test of capability to understand, def end, and ob-
ject makes it possible for the defendant to secure a hearing be-
fore competent medical experts.26 Thus it is possible for trial 
or execution to be indefinitely postponed upon the basis of tests 
less strict than M'Naghten's rule. It is to be noted, however, 
that commitment under such circumstances could hardly be con-
dusive to treatment of curable cases; nor does it serve the interest 
of the state in restoring patients to useful citizen status. 
B. During Imprisonment 
The Nebraska statutes provide that a mentally ill prisoner 
can be transferred to a mental institution upon the recommenda-
tion of the prison physician and the concurrence of the Peni-
tentiary Medical Board.2; There are more than thirty prisoners 
at the Lincoln State Hospital who have been transferred under 
this procedure.28 No accurate estimate may be given relative to 
the number of psychotic immates now in Nebraska penal institu-
tions; however, the state has a tenative plan to provide for 150 
inmates in the "new maximum security" building to be built at 
the Lincoln State Hospital. This building will house prisoners 
from the state penal institutions who, because of mental illness, 
have not been amenable to punishment. Since many of the men-
tally ill inmates never pose problems or create disturbances, they 
may go unnoticed by the prison physician. In other cases, because 
of crowded conditions of the state mental institutions, the con-
23ln re Grammer, 104 Neb. 744, 178 N.W. 624 (1920); In re Barker, 
79 Neb. 361, 113 N.W. 197 (1907); Walker v. State, 46 Neb. 25, 64 N.W. 
357 (1895). 
24 Ibid; Witte v. Gilbert, 10 Neb. 539, 7 N.W. 288 (1880). 
25 In re Grammer, 1·04 Neb. 744, 748, 178 N.W. 624, 626 (1920); Hawe 
v. State, 11 Neb. 537, 538, 10 N.W. 452, 453 (1881). 
26 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2509 (Reissue 1948). 
27 Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 83-358, 83-359 (Reissue 1950). 
28 The author wishes to express his appreciation to Dr. F. L. Spradling. 
Superintendent of the Lincoln State Hospital who gave generously of his 
time to discuss this problem. 
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currence of the State Penitentiary Medical Board is not always 
forthcoming. 
While it is recognized that these figures include mentally ill 
inmates whose condition arose subsequent to imprisonment, it is 
likewise possible that many of these inmates were within the Dur-
ham test at the time of trial. This conclusion is substantiated by 
a study made at the Eastern State Penitentiary in Philadelphia 
from 1931 to 1941 which disclosed that one out of every forty-
two felons sentenced there, was either mentally disordered to a 
committable degree at the time of confinement or developed such 
a condition while imprisoned.29 
Under the inadequate screening procedure existing in Ne-
braska, such men and women, upon completion of sentence, are 
once more free in a society they are no more fit to cope with than 
before. 
C. Collateral Problems 
One further problem may be briefly considered. Many de-
fendants, not faced with extreme punishment, decline to plead in-
sanity because they pref er the statutory sentence instead of pos-
sible extended commitment to a mental hospital following an ac-
quittal because of insanity.30 It is possible, therefore, for a de-
fendant with a recorded background of mental illness, by not 
pleading insanity, to secure a short prison sentence, rather than a 
longer period of commitment in a mental institution. This is 
directly contrary to the interests and intentions of the state and 
society exemplified by the state statute which gives first priority 
to room in state hospitals to " ... patients whose care in the state 
hospital is necessary in order to protect the public health and 
safety ... "31 This problem could be alleviated by setting up a 
procedure such as the one followed in Massachusetts.32 Under the 
Massachusetts procedure every person indicted by a grand jury 
for a capital offense, or previously indicted for any other offense 
more than once, or previously convicted of a felony is examined 
by the state to determine his mental condition and the existence 
of any mental disease or defect which would affect his criminal 
responsibility. A report of this investigation is filed with the 
clerk of the court and made available to the court, probation of-
ficer, and attorneys for both parties.33 This procedure could be 
20 Report No. 26, op. cit. supra note 7, at 4. 
30 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2203 (Reissue 1948). 
31 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-338 (Reissue 1950). 
321\Iass. Laws Ann. c. 123, § lOOA (1949). 
33 See Glueck, Crime and Correction, 36 Yale L.J. 632 (1927). 
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used most effectively by courts following the Durham rule, with 
its broad scope of investigation and liberal concept of criminal 
responsibility, to place off enders, whose eventual release would 
be a danger to society, in mental institutions. 
V. CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that the "strict" rule now applied in Nebraska 
under the M'N aghten formula does not have the restrictive effect 
sought. In use its effect is only to thwart those who seek a valid 
insight into the defendant's acts. It is unfair to those whom we 
now know scientifically to be mentally ill because it applies an 
outworn concept of insanity which may soon be so obsolete as to 
violate the Fourteenth Amendment. It is hindering the treatment 
of curable cases of mental illness. Finally, it makes it possible 
for persons dangerous to society because of mental disease or de-
fects to be released into the population. A more sure method of 
dealing with these cases and eliminating the evils now present is 
offered in the Durham rule in conjunction with examination pro-
cedures similar to those followed in Massachusetts. 
Lyman C. Johnson, '56 
